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RELATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CEO CONTINUITY:  
A PROPERTY RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract  
Inspired by agency theory, research on CEO succession often focuses on turnovers as a 
mechanism to discipline CEOs in the event of poor firm performance. Recent research extends 
this view by showing that CEO turnovers can also lead to substantial disruption in a firm’s 
management. Less is known, however, about the antecedents of disruption and continuity in the 
context of CEO turnovers. Drawing on modern property rights theory, this paper investigates 
how CEO continuity varies across different types of firms. Using a sample of Swiss, publicly 
traded firms, we find that relational ownership enhances the likelihood of CEOs staying in office 
or moving to the position of board chair. Firms with little relational ownership, in contrast, 
display a high degree of CEO continuity only when capital intensity is high. Provided that a CEO 
turnover occurs, relational ownership and capital intensity reduce the likelihood of interim CEO 
successions. These findings highlight the importance of a nuanced view of CEO continuity, 
taking into account owner types as well as contextual factors. 
 
 
Keywords: CEO succession; CEO turnovers; incomplete contracts; interim succession; 
ownership structure; property rights; stakeholders 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chief executive officer (CEO) successions are a central topic in strategic management and 
corporate governance. Since the late 1990s, the world’s largest economies have witnessed a 
substantial increase in the frequency of CEO turnovers, leading to the depiction of CEOs as the 
world’s ‘most prominent temp workers’ (Lucier et al., 2005: 1). Inspired by agency theory (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), many studies have focused on CEO turnovers as a disciplining 
mechanism—i.e., the prospect of being replaced in the event of poor firm performance can 
discipline CEOs to enhance shareholder value (e.g., Volpin, 2002). In this view, the high rate of 
CEO turnover could be seen as a desirable development because long-tenured CEOs can become 
less dynamic and innovative (Miller, 1991). 
Recent research, in contrast, highlights the frequently disruptive nature of CEO turnovers 
for a firm (e.g., Krause and Semadeni, 2014, Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). Frequent disruption 
in the CEO position can have undesirable effects, such as power struggles among top managers 
and uncertainty among stakeholders about the firm’s future direction and policies (Kesner and 
Sebora, 1994). Thus, continuity in the firm’s CEO position (henceforth: ‘CEO continuity’) has 
advantages and disadvantages. Less is known, however, about the antecedents of CEO continuity. 
In particular, an important question is whether the advantages and disadvantages of CEO 
continuity differ in their importance for different types of firms. 
By joining agency theory and modern property rights theory, we can obtain a deeper 
understanding of the trade-offs that firms face with regard to CEO successions. Modern property 
rights theory serves as a lens to analyse the firm’s relationships with its stakeholders (Asher et al., 
2005, Blair and Stout, 1999, Grossman and Hart, 1986, Mayer, 2013). In this perspective, the 
firm’s long-term success hinges on the contributions of various stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, customers, and the local community). These stakeholders often make 
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substantial (monetary or non-monetary) investments that are difficult to safeguard through formal 
contracts (Wang et al., 2009). This lack of contractual protection leaves stakeholders vulnerable 
to exploitation (Klein et al., 1978). Therefore, they need to rely on implicit contracts, defined as 
‘informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct’ that cannot be enforced by courts (Baker 
et al., 2002: 39). CEOs and top managers assume a crucial role in protecting these implicit 
contracts, due to their position at the centre of the nexus of (explicit and implicit) contracts with 
stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). CEO continuity is likely to reassure the firm’s stakeholders 
about the future maintenance of their implicit contracts (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000), whereas 
frequent disruptions create uncertainty about the firm’s adherence to them. 
This paper contributes to understanding continuity in CEO successions. We begin by 
contrasting agency theory and property rights theory, highlighting their implications for CEO 
continuity. To examine the antecedents of CEO continuity, we develop hypotheses focusing on 
the distinction between relational and transactional ownership (e.g., David et al., 2010) and on the 
direct and moderating influence of capital intensity. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 
Swiss, publicly traded firms in the period 2000 to 2008. We explain the empirical context and its 
advantages, present the empirical findings, and discuss their theoretical and practical relevance. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Research on CEO turnovers often applies agency theory, considering CEOs as agents of 
shareholders as their principals. The agency problem results from the separation of ownership 
and control in public corporations (Berle and Means, 1932). Due to the partially conflicting goals 
of agents and principals, agency theory has devoted a lot of attention to mechanisms that align 
their interests (Fama, 1980, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this view, CEO turnovers can 
improve the alignment of interests by punishing and replacing poorly performing CEOs. 
An alternative perspective—drawing on modern property rights theory (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990)—suggests that the investments of multiple stakeholders 
(including shareholders) need to be protected (Asher et al., 2005, Blair and Stout, 1999, Mayer, 
2013). For example, such investments include employees who acquire firm-specific knowledge; 
suppliers who invest in research to tailor their intermediate products to the needs of the firm; 
customers who assist in the development of products; and the local community that invests in 
better access to the firm’s facilities. Such firm-specific investments are essential to the firm’s 
long-term success (Antras, 2014, Zingales, 2000). Therefore, these stakeholders  represent 
multiple principals whose interests require protection (Child and Rodrigues, 2003).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 contrasts these theoretical perspectives and their implications for CEO succession. 
CEO continuity is clearly a greater concern when adopting the property rights perspective. CEOs 
assume a unique role in safeguarding implicit contracts with stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Therefore, CEO continuity has an important function in reassuring stakeholders about the future 
maintenance of their implicit contracts (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000). 
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Continuity in CEO successions 
How can we conceptualize continuity in the context of CEO successions? Prior studies on CEO 
successions have produced numerous valuable insights from an agency theoretic perspective by 
distinguishing between unforced CEO turnovers and forced CEO dismissals. These studies 
highlight the relationship between poor firm performance and CEO dismissals, and how this 
relationship is influenced by governance mechanisms (e.g., Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). From 
the property rights perspective, however, CEO turnovers represent disruptions for the firm and its 
stakeholders regardless of whether they are forced or unforced (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
Indeed, Kaplan and Minton find that both types of CEO successions are sensitive to poor firm 
performance, and they suggest that ‘many unforced turnovers are not voluntary’ (2008: 17). 
Although changes in the CEO position are inevitable, there is variation in the continuity 
related to CEO successions. We distinguish between two types of analysis. First, firms can 
maintain a high degree of CEO continuity by granting CEOs long tenures and/or by promoting 
them to the position of board chair at the end of their tenure (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). This 
type of promotion is known as ‘apprenticing’ because it enables predecessors to remain involved 
in major decisions and pass their strategies and values on to their successors (Krause and 
Semadeni, 2013). To illustrate, the CEO of SABMiller, a leading beverage producer, was 
promoted to the position of board chair in 2013, and this decision was justified by the firm’s need 
for a chair who can ‘provide stability and continuity for a number of years’ (Wall Street Journal, 
2012). This type of succession can substitute for long CEO tenures in maintaining CEO 
continuity. To illustrate, CEOs in large Japanese firms typically have relatively short tenures. 
Nevertheless, these firms are known for their emphasis on CEO continuity because they often 
promote CEOs to board chair (Lucier et al., 2006). 
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Second, provided that a CEO succession occurs, the degree of disruption depends in large 
part on whether a permanent successor (or an interim successor) is appointed. Ballinger and 
Marcel have drawn attention to the disruptions caused by interim CEO successions, defined as 
cases where ‘the title of chief executive officer is vacated by the incumbent and the board of 
directors has not announced a permanent successor’ (2010: 262). Interim CEO successions are 
particularly disruptive because they create extended uncertainty, thereby precipitating problems, 
such as the fragmentation of the top management team and the ambiguity about the firm’s future 
strategy. Hence, interim CEO successions are likely to deepen the disruptions associated with 
CEO turnovers (Grusky, 1960). 
Using these two outcomes, we analyse theoretical antecedents of CEO continuity. 
Specifically, we consider relational ownership and capital intensity. Following Shen and Cho 
(2005), these two antecedents affect different types of managerial discretion. Relational 
ownership influences the CEOs’ latitude of objectives: their discretion to pursue objectives 
beyond purely monetary gains (see also Jensen, 2010). Capital intensity, in contrast, influences 
their latitude of actions: the range of strategic options available to them. 
 
Relational ownership as an antecedent 
The research literature has shown increasing interest in the heterogeneity among shareholders 
(e.g., Aguilera and Jackson, 2010, Connelly et al., 2010, Hautz et al., 2013). Our analysis draws 
on the distinction between ‘relational’ and ‘transactional’ shareholders. Relational shareholders 
are long-term owners who have complex performance goals beyond financial gains. These 
complex goals are also known as ‘strategic interests’ (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In contrast, 
David et al. (2010: 638) describe transactional shareholders as those ‘who obtain returns solely 
from their shareholdings and lack other relationships with the firms’. Transactional owners may 
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hold their shares for the short or long term. In either case, the benefit they draw from their 
shareholding is predominantly or purely of a financial nature. 
The following examples help illustrate the difference between relational and transactional 
shareholders. Sometimes families own long-term shareholdings with the intention of passing 
them on to their next generation. These families typically have complex performance goals, 
because they benefit from financial returns and from their socio-emotional wealth. Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2007: 106) define socio-emotional wealth as ‘non-financial aspects of the firm that meet 
the family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty’. The families’ non-financial benefits are often a reason for 
them to support the firms’ implicit contracts with stakeholders. To illustrate, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2011: 682) review the literature on family firms and point out that most papers ‘explain the 
family firm’s substantial responsiveness to stakeholder needs as driven by non-economic utilities 
derived by dominant family owners’. As a second example, the distinction between relational and 
transactional shareholders is present in studies on institutional shareholders in Japan. This 
research suggests that Japanese institutional shareholders have complex performance goals 
beyond financial returns because they are embedded in a local system with close ties (Ahmadjian 
and Robbins, 2005). Compared with foreign (transactional) owners, these (relational) domestic 
owners are more supportive of implicit contracts with the firms’ stakeholders, such as lifetime 
employees and core suppliers (e.g., Yoshikawa et al., 2005). 
Relational and transactional shareholders are likely to differ in their support for CEO 
continuity. First, relational shareholders are likely to be willing to support implicit contracts with 
other stakeholders, whereas transactional shareholders are likely to be dispassionate toward such 
implicit contracts. Therefore, relational shareholders are more likely than transactional 
shareholders to support CEO continuity to maintain implicit contracts with stakeholders. 
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Second, relational and transactional shareholders are likely to differ in their tendency to 
push the board to replace the CEO. The pressure of shareholders on boards is illustrated in 
Wiersema’s (2002: 77) statement that ‘typically a CEO gets fired not because the board has 
thoughtfully and deliberately concluded that it’s time for a change at the top but because 
investors, concerned about poor performance, demand a change’. This pressure increases under 
adverse environmental conditions, due to the inherent difficulty of disentangling environmental 
from managerial influences on firm performance (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Jenter and Kanaan 
(2008) underline this difficulty by showing that CEO turnovers are sensitive to industry-adjusted 
firm performance as well as industry and market performance. Relational shareholders, given 
their long-term involvement, are often able to exercise their voice early in the decision-making 
process. Transactional shareholders, in contrast, are often confronted with important managerial 
decisions after the fact. Therefore, transactional shareholders are likely to take more drastic 
measures to express their dissatisfaction, such as pushing for decision reversals and CEO 
replacements. Indeed, Weisbach (1995) shows empirically that decision reversals (e.g., the 
divestiture of unprofitable acquisitions) are especially likely to coincide with CEO turnovers. 
This discussion leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  Relational ownership will be positively associated with CEO continuity. 
 
The role of capital intensity 
CEO continuity is likely to depend on the firm’s context. The research literature has discussed 
various contextual characteristics that affect the CEO’s latitude of actions (e.g., Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011, Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). Capital intensity— a proxy for the magnitude of 
‘assets-in-place’ (Skinner, 1993)—is particularly relevant to CEO continuity. High capital 
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intensity is a way of making binding resource commitments. As a result, high capital intensity 
creates strategic rigidity in firms (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995) and constrains managers 
from deviating from a long-term course of action (Ghemawat, 1991). 
A high degree of CEO continuity is especially beneficial in a context of high capital 
intensity. High investments in fixed assets lead to sunk costs and thereby make deviations from 
past practices risky and expensive (Datta et al., 2003). As a consequence, efficient asset 
management, stability, and the CEO’s firm-specific knowledge are particularly important in 
capital-intensive firms (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998). The importance of firm-specific 
knowledge makes CEOs less interchangeable (Castanias and Helfat, 1991). Furthermore, when 
firms are bound to long-term courses of action, stakeholders have stronger incentives to make 
firm-specific investments due to the lower risk that these investments become obsolete (Wang 
and Barney, 2006). This further increases the benefits to continuity. In contrast, when there are 
few constraints on the firm’s long-term courses of action, discontinuities in the firm’s top 
management represent opportunities to break with the past, experiment with new strategies, 
redeploy the firm’s resources more flexibly, and seize emerging business opportunities (Adams et 
al., 2011). In sum, managerial renewals are more beneficial when capital intensity is low, and the 
advantages of CEO continuity are less pronounced. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Capital intensity will be positively associated with CEO continuity. 
 
Interaction between relational ownership and capital intensity 
How does relational ownership interact with the degree of capital intensity? Firms dominated by 
relational shareholders are likely to emphasize CEO continuity, even when capital intensity is 
low. Although higher capital intensity increases the benefits to CEO continuity, this only 
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underlines the inherent tendency that these firms already have. Relational shareholders have a 
long time horizon and tend to be supportive of implicit contracts with other stakeholders 
(Yoshikawa et al., 2005). High capital intensity supports this orientation by dedicating resources 
to long-term purposes. Therefore, we expect that higher capital intensity will have a 
comparatively weak effect due to these firms’ already strong emphasis on CEO continuity. 
Firms dominated by transactional shareholders (i.e., little relational ownership), in 
contrast, lack an inherent tendency to emphasize CEO continuity. Given their relatively weak 
support for implicit contracts with other stakeholders (Mayer, 2013), they are more likely to seek 
the benefits of CEO discontinuities, i.e., managerial renewal, breaking with the past, and 
experimenting with new strategies. Although these benefits are important in a context of low 
capital intensity, they diminish when capital intensity is high due to the lack of strategic 
flexibility and the dependence on the CEO’s firm-specific knowledge. As a result, CEO 
discontinuities can become risky and expensive. High capital intensity is likely to represent a 
considerable constraint for these firms. Therefore, we expect that higher capital intensity will 
have a strong effect on these firms’ emphasis on CEO continuity. These considerations lead to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.  If relational ownership is low, CEO continuity will be highly sensitive to the 
degree of capital intensity. Conversely, if relational ownership is high, CEO continuity will be 
relatively insensitive to the degree of capital intensity. 
 
Interim CEO succession 
We examine interim CEO succession as a second outcome. Ballinger and Marcel (2010) show 
that interim successions are typically related to unexpected CEO departures and abrupt losses of 
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confidence between the board and the current CEO. Although CEO turnovers generally tend to be 
disruptive (Grusky, 1960), interim CEO successions are particularly disruptive due to the power 
vacuum and the uncertainty about the next permanent leader (Marcel et al., 2016). Interim CEOs 
often lack the authority to set a long-term direction for the firm (Wall Street Journal, 2006). 
Moreover, interim successions can cause stakeholders to lose confidence in their implicit 
contracts with the firm and to switch to other trading partners (Chen et al., 2015). Firms that 
emphasize CEO continuity are likely to be particularly cautious in avoiding interim CEO 
succession. We apply Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 to interim CEO succession as a second dependent 
variable. Because interim CEO succession reflects discontinuity, we expect that the coefficients 
will show the opposite sign (i.e., β1 < 0, β2 < 0, and β3 > 0; see Methods section). 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
Switzerland as an empirical context 
This study uses a sample of Swiss firms. A beneficial characteristic of Swiss listed firms is their 
variation in ownership structures. La Porta et al. (1999) compared the level of ownership 
concentration in listed firms across countries. In Switzerland, 60 percent of large firms and 50 
percent of medium-sized firms were widely held. The corresponding figures for other countries 
were substantially more skewed (e.g., UK: 100 and 60 percent; US: 80 and 90 percent; France: 
60 and 0 percent; and Germany: 50 and 10 percent). As these figures illustrate, Switzerland is 
between the liberal market economies (e.g., the UK and the US) and the coordinated market 
economies (e.g., France and Germany) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Although some studies position 
Switzerland in the latter category (e.g., Jackson, 2005), Switzerland features a high stock market 
capitalization relative to gross domestic product and thereby has similarities with countries in the 
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former category. The Swiss setting includes firms with various ownership structures operating 
under the same legal framework. This variety of ownership structures helps generalize our 
findings to other developed economies, particularly to those with a similarly low level of 
government interference in firms (such as the UK). Other typical features of Swiss listed firms 
are a high degree of internationalization (because Switzerland is a small open economy) and a 
focus on achieving competitive positions in international market niches. 
The observation period comprises the years 2000 to 2008. Using the Swiss Stock Guide 
(Finanz und Wirtschaft, 2000-2008), we selected all firms that were listed for at least six years 
during this period. How does this observation period compare with the time after the global 
financial crisis (GFC)? First, CEO turnovers temporarily decreased after the GFC, but soon 
returned to the pre-GFC levels in international statistics (Favaro et al., 2012). In both periods, 
CEO turnovers occurred more frequently than in the 1990s (Lucier et al., 2005). Second, the pre-
GFC period was less affected by regulatory changes. The Swiss Code of Corporate Governance, 
introduced in 2002, remained entirely voluntary and emphasized that firms should retain their 
freedom to design their own structures. After the GFC, however, perceived corporate governance 
failures led to a popular initiative in 2013 demanding better checks on excessive managerial 
salaries. Two-thirds of the electorate voted in favour of the initiative, resulting in a new law that 
increased shareholders’ rights (e.g., by enabling shareholders to re-elect board members more 
frequently). To summarize, the pre-GFC period is comparable with the post-GFC period in terms 
of CEO turnover frequency, but has the advantage of a more stable regulatory environment. 
Although our findings may not apply to the turbulent years of the crisis (which is an interesting 
separate research question), they are likely to extend to the more stable subsequent period. 
The final sample included 200 corporations with 380 CEOs. We excluded 27 investment 
firms from the sample because their main business is investing in other firms. The firms in the 
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sample represent the following industries according to Datastream’s ‘business sector’ 
classification: automobiles and parts (0.52%), banks (10.78%), basic resources (2.61%), 
chemicals (4.17%), construction and materials (3.07%), financial services (10.14%), food and 
beverage (3.13%), health care (10.49%), industrial goods and services (23.46%), insurance 
(3.53%), media (3.53%), personal and household goods (4.92%), retail (3.01%), technology 
(7.88%), telecommunication (0.52%), travel and leisure (4.11%), and utilities (4.11%). 
 
Dependent variables 
There are two dependent variables, namely CEO continuity and interim CEO successions. For the 
measurement of these variables, we used annual reports, press releases, newspaper articles, and 
the Swiss Stock Guide. The coding procedure is described in the following sections. 
 
CEO continuity 
There were 215 CEO successions in the sample. We excluded those related to exogenous shocks: 
death (2 cases), health problems (1 case), and mergers (4 cases). Among the remaining 208 
successions, 44 involved promotions to board chair. We measured CEO continuity as each firm-
year where the CEO either stayed in office or was promoted to board chair. The variable for CEO 
continuity was coded as 1 for 1,701 firm-years and as 0 for 164 firm-years. 
Furthermore, we assessed whether retirement at the age of 65 might represent an 
exogenous shock. Among CEOs whose age was known, 31 CEOs were more than 63 years old. 
17 of them remained active board members, and only 8 CEOs retired. One of the 8 retired CEOs 
later became the CEO of UBS, one of the largest Swiss banks. This evidence suggests that 
retirement is not an exogenous shock. Boards have the choice to maintain CEO continuity either 
by retaining them as CEOs or by promoting them to board chair. 
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Interim CEO succession 
Following Ballinger and Marcel (2010), interim successions represent cases where CEOs left 
office without a permanent successor being announced by the board of directors. Based on the 
analysis of press releases and newspaper articles, we identified 27 among the 164 CEO 
successions as interim successions. 
 
Independent variables 
The first independent variable is relational ownership. The Swiss Stock Guide provides a yearly 
assessment of the percentage of equity capital that is non-tradable on the stock market due to the 
shareholders’ long-term relationship with the firm. These shareholders typically have complex 
performance goals that go beyond financial gains. They are unlikely to sell their shares even if 
there is a short-term increase in share price. Given their long-term involvement, they are also 
more likely to engage with or seek representation on the board of directors. Using the Swiss 
Stock Guide, we measured relational ownership as the percentage of votes held by relational (as 
opposed to transactional) owners. This measure had the advantage that it was a forward-looking 
assessment from within the investment community. However, it needed to be adjusted because, in 
the case of dual-class shares, some shareholders had more votes than their share of equity capital. 
We corrected the variable for relational ownership, such that it measured their proportion of 
votes. Conversely, transactional ownership was the proportion of votes held by other (i.e., not 
relational) shareholders. 
The second independent variable is capital intensity. As discussed, capital intensity 
represents a constraint on managerial discretion in deviating from a long-term course of action. 
This constraint depends to a considerable extent on the firm’s industry and, indeed, some studies 
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measure capital intensity as an industry-level characteristic (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). 
However, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) suggest that this constraint depends both on the industry 
and the firm’s legacy from past decisions. Following their measurement, we computed capital 
intensity at the firm level as the natural logarithm of the book value of property, plant, and 
equipment, divided by the number of employees. The data were collected from the Datastream 
databases of Thomson Reuters. 
 
Control variables 
The following control variables draw on data from the Datastream databases of Thomson 
Reuters, the Swiss Stock Guide, annual reports, press releases, and newspaper articles. Firm 
performance is likely to enhance CEO continuity because strong firm performance tends to 
increase confidence in the firm’s management (e.g., Powers, 2005). We applied two measures for 
firm performance, namely stock return as a market-based measure and industry-adjusted return 
on assets (ROA) as an accounting-based measure. Both measures were lagged by one year. Stock 
return was calculated as the continuous annual return including value appreciation and dividend 
yield. Some previous studies used industry-adjusted stock returns, whereas others did not make 
this adjustment based on the argument that market-based measures already adjust for industry 
variation (e.g., Kerr and Bettis, 1987). Both measures yielded similar results in the regressions. 
The presented results show the latter variant. Industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) was 
computed by subtracting the median industry ROA from the firm’s ROA, using Datastream’s 
level 3 industry sectors. 
We also controlled for the following firm and CEO characteristics. Firm size was the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees. Firm growth represented the standardized growth 
coefficients: we regressed firm sales against time in the five preceding years and divided the 
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regression slope coefficients by the mean value of sales (e.g., Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). 
Furthermore, three dummy variables measured whether the CEO occupied the positions of both 
CEO and board chair (CEO duality), whether the CEO was the firm’s founder (CEO founder), 
and whether the CEO’s predecessor was the firm’s founder (predecessor founder). The dummy 
variables were coded as 1 in the affirmative case and 0 otherwise. 
 
Data analysis 
We tested the hypotheses using discrete-time event history analysis (Allison, 1984). This method 
estimates hazard rates of ending a process (here: CEO continuity), and therefore is particularly 
suitable for the present study. The method can account for several CEO changes within the 
observed time period. Studies on CEO turnovers often apply this method to avoid the biases that 
would occur when simply using CEO tenure (or a similar variable) as a dependent variable (e.g., 
Zhang, 2008). 
Discrete-time event history analysis has three main advantages. First, this method takes 
into account the time-dependence of hazard rates. To illustrate, Allgood and Farrell (2003) report 
that hazard rates of CEO successions in their sample increase until the fifth year of CEO tenure, 
and then decrease. This method is flexible because it does not assume a specific functional form 
for the baseline hazard rates over time (Allison, 1982). Second, this method enables the use of 
time-constant and time-varying covariates to explain the variation around the baseline hazard 
rates. Third, it is capable of dealing with right-censored data, i.e., cases where the CEO leaves the 
study before a CEO turnover occurs. In the case of exogenous shocks, such as CEO death or 
health problems, our analysis retains the information that no CEO discontinuity happened up to 
the year of the exogenous shock. 
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In applying this method, we grouped the observations in the firm-year matrix by CEO 
tenure-years and then estimated the hazard rates (i.e., the likelihood of CEO continuity) using 
probit regression on pooled time-series data. The regression models used a robust variance-
covariance estimation of standard errors, clustered at the CEO level. In sum, we estimated the 
following models to assess the above three hypotheses. 
Probit(CEO Continuity) = β1 * Relational Ownership + β2 * Capital Intensity + β4 * Stock 
Return + β5 * CEO Duality + β6 * CEO Founder + β7 * Predecessor Founder + β8 * Firm 
Size + β9 * Firm Growth + βs * Tenure Year Dummies + ε 
(Hypothesis 1: β1 > 0; Hypothesis 2: β2 > 0) 
 
Probit(CEO Continuity) = β1 * Relational Ownership + β2 * Capital Intensity + β3 * 
Relational Ownership X Capital Intensity + β4 * Stock Return + β5 * CEO Duality + β6 * 
CEO Founder + β7 * Predecessor Founder + β8 * Firm Size + β9 * Firm Growth + βs * 
Tenure Year Dummies + ε 
(Hypothesis 3: β3 < 0) 
 
The second outcome is interim CEO succession. Given that interim CEO succession can only 
occur in the case of a CEO turnover, we estimated the following models (without and with 
interaction effect, respectively). 
Probit(Interim CEO Succession | CEO Turnover) = β1 * Relational Ownership + β2 * 
Capital Intensity + β4 * Stock Return + β5 * CEO Duality + β6 * CEO Founder + β7 * 
Predecessor Founder + β8 * Firm Size + β9 * Firm Growth + βs * Tenure Year Dummies 
+ ε 
(Hypothesis 1: β1 < 0; Hypothesis 2: β2 < 0) 
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Probit(Interim CEO Succession | CEO Turnover) = β1 * Relational Ownership + β2 * 
Capital Intensity + β3 * Relational Ownership X Capital Intensity + β4 * Stock Return + β5 
* CEO Duality + β6 * CEO Founder + β7 * Predecessor Founder + β8 * Firm Size + β9 * 
Firm Growth + βs * Tenure Year Dummies + ε 
(Hypothesis 3: β3 > 0) 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 3 summarizes the results of discrete-time event history analysis without interaction effects. 
The first two models show only the effects of control variables on the likelihood of CEO 
continuity, using stock return (Model 1) and industry-adjusted ROA (Model 2) as alternative 
performance measures. Because ROA was not significant in any of the model specifications, we 
retained stock return as a control variable in the subsequent regressions. Model 3 adds relational 
ownership and capital intensity. As there was a high multicollinearity between the constant term 
and the other explanatory variables, we calculated the regressions without a constant term. This 
means that the regression coefficients are computed using the absolute levels of the independent 
and dependent variables, instead of the deviations from their means (Greene, 2008). 
The results in Table 3 show that relational ownership and capital intensity have positive 
and significant effects on CEO continuity, as proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Strong firm 
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performance significantly increases CEO continuity as expected. CEO duality indicates a 
powerful CEO position (e.g., Aguilera, 2005) and positively influences CEO continuity. 
Furthermore, the existence of a predecessor founder has a positive and significant effect. This 
result is consistent with Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) suggestion that there is an increased need for 
stability after the departure of the firm’s founder. Finally, firm size positively influences CEO 
continuity. This finding might be attributed to need for CEOs to acquire firm-specific knowledge, 
given the complexity of relationships within large firms. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In Table 4, the first two models show that neither relational ownership nor capital intensity 
significantly interact with stock return. Thus, both predictor variables’ effects on CEO continuity 
do not depend systematically on the level of firm performance. Then, Model 3 shows the 
interaction effect of principal interest. The interaction between relational ownership and capital 
intensity is negative and significant, consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Given that interaction effects in non-linear models can sometimes be misleading (Powers, 2005), 
we conducted a statistical simulation based on Zelner’s (2009) technique for the interaction 
between relational ownership and capital intensity. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
capital intensity and CEO continuity, holding relational ownership at 20 percent (i.e., the first 
quartile) and at 68 percent (i.e., the third quartile). The bands around the lines indicate the 95 
percent confidence intervals obtained through statistical simulation. This figure shows that when 
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relational ownership is low, CEO continuity is highly sensitive to the degree of capital intensity 
(i.e., the line has a considerable upward slope). In contrast, when relational ownership is high, 
CEO continuity is relatively insensitive to the degree of capital intensity (i.e., the line is relatively 
flat). Thus, Figure 1 offers further support for Hypothesis 3.1  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Finally, we investigated the effects of relational ownership and capital intensity on interim CEO 
successions. Because interim successions can occur only in the case of a CEO turnover, we 
applied a variant of Heckman’s (1979) sample selection model that has been adapted to probit 
regressions (i.e., a Heckman probit estimation) (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) (see Table 5). 
The results show that the predictor variables (relational ownership and capital intensity) reduce 
the likelihood of interim CEO successions (Model 1). However, there is no significant interaction 
effect between relational ownership and capital intensity (Model 2). When using interim CEO 
successions as an alternative outcome, results show additional corroboration for the first two 
hypotheses, but not for the third one. Nevertheless, these results are encouraging because interim 
CEO successions occur very rarely and reflect only a very special case of CEO discontinuity. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, we examined the possibility of endogeneity in the predictor variables, using the procedure described 
by Rivers and Vuong (1988) for dichotomous dependent and continuous independent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). 
For the two potentially endogenous variables (relational ownership and capital intensity), we used the industry-
averages as the instruments. The residuals showed no evidence for endogeneity. Moreover, the coefficients of 
relational ownership, capital intensity, and their interaction remained qualitatively similar to those in the main 
regression models. 
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DISCUSSION 
The above analysis highlights the usefulness of joining different theoretical perspectives to gain a 
richer understanding of CEO successions. Studies using agency theory tend to emphasize the 
disciplining effects of CEO turnovers under conditions of poor firm performance. In contrast, 
using modern property rights theory, the present study points to the importance of maintaining 
CEO continuity under long-term considerations (here: relational ownership and capital intensity). 
Our theoretical analysis suggests that these factors influence the benefits to CEO continuity. 
There exist also other theoretical perspectives that deviate from the traditional agency 
theoretic analysis of CEO successions. For example, Chabrak et al.’s (2016) study applies the 
sociological theory of structuration to examine the case of Vivendi Universal (VU). They discuss 
how the ‘established elite’ (i.e., the French establishment) and the ‘old guard’ (i.e., the Bronfman 
family as a longstanding shareholder) cooperated to oust the ‘nouveau riche’ (i.e., Mr Messier, 
the CEO of VU). This qualitative case study shows how class relationships affected Mr Messier’s 
agency. Our approach based on property rights theory offers a complementary interpretation of 
this case. In particular, VU’s shareholder structure changed considerably over time. The influence 
of transactional shareholders continuously increased in the years prior to Mr Messier’s ousting. 
This increase in transactional ownership coincided with greater strategic agility and with Mr 
Messier reneging on implicit contracts with stakeholders (e.g., the preservation of French 
influence on the firm’s environmental operations and the funding of French cinema). Although 
the established elite were dissatisfied about the breach of implicit contracts, they were unable to 
oust Mr Messier on their own. When the firm’s stock price deteriorated, however, they were able 
to use poor firm performance as ‘ammunition’ and to collaborate with shareholders in ousting Mr 
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Messier. As this example illustrates, a combination of theoretical perspectives helps create a more 
nuanced understanding of the influence of shareholders on CEO succession. 
Joining agency theory and modern property rights theory helps to understand the trade-
offs with regard to CEO successions. For instance, firms in the information technology sector 
often face a double challenge: (a) committing to long-term implicit contracts with employees and 
other stakeholders and (b) being attractive to transactional shareholders due to the firm’s need of 
growth capital. For example, in 2004, Google launched an initial public offering (IPO) thereby 
attracting investment by transactional shareholders. At the same time, Google’s (2004) IPO letter 
stated the founders’ desire for maintaining stability and continuity over long time periods. 
This trade-off is particularly challenging due to the negative relationship between 
transactional ownership and CEO continuity. One solution, adopted by Google and many other 
technology firms, is the issuance of dual-class shares. Using an agency theoretic lens, dual-class 
shares exacerbate the management’s incentive problems (Bebchuk et al., 2000: 295). In contrast, 
applying the modern property rights perspective, dual-class shares represent an opportunity to 
commit to implicit contracts. This type of share enables relational shareholders to retain control 
while offering transactional shareholders the right to share in the firm’s profits. To illustrate, 
Google’s (2004) IPO letter suggests that its dual-class structure enables employees to trust that 
the firm will honour its long-term commitments. 
The property rights perspective also has interesting implications for the second predictor 
variable: capital intensity. In capital-intensive firms, CEOs have relatively high discretion to 
influence the firm’s earnings. In particular, CEOs can choose different timings for large capital 
expenditures, and they can choose different accounting methods for depreciation (Bowen et al., 
2008). According to positive accounting theory (Christensen et al., 2016, Watts and Zimmerman, 
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1990), the CEO’s discretion in influencing the firm’s earnings reduces the effectiveness of 
management compensation contracts based on accounting numbers (Beattie et al., 1994). 
How is it possible to incentivize CEOs in such a setting? The property rights perspective 
offers an intriguing solution: access. Rajan and Zingales (1998: 388) define access as ‘the ability 
to use, or work with, a critical resource’. Access offers individuals the opportunity to specialize 
their human capital, thereby making themselves valuable. If CEOs have continued access to the 
critical resource (in this case: the firm), they have an incentive to acquire firm-specific 
knowledge. According to Rajan and Zingales (1998: 388), ‘access gives her the ability to create a 
critical resource that she controls: her specialized human capital’. A potential downside of access 
is that CEOs may steal a resource (e.g., a novel business idea) and create a rival firm. In capital-
intensive firms, however, this risk is relatively small due to the fixed nature of capital 
investments. 
These considerations enrich the interpretation of the findings on CEO continuity. We can 
interpret a high degree of CEO continuity as a way of offering managers access to the firm. 
Access can sometimes be a better incentive mechanism than cash flow rights (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2001). The reason is that the managers’ benefit from access is positively correlated with 
their own investments in firm-specific knowledge (i.e., the managers’ benefits are highly 
contingent on them making the right investments). 
Finally, property rights theory adds nuance to the role of CEOs in the literature on CEO 
successions. In agency theory, the focus is on the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
CEOs (and on replacing CEOs when firm performance is poor). The assumption is that CEOs 
have a direct responsibility for the firm’s financial performance (Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). 
Property rights theory, in contrast, highlights that CEOs also contribute indirectly to the firm 
performance by upholding implicit contracts with other stakeholders. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on CEO succession. The theoretical 
analysis uses property rights theory to highlight CEO continuity as an important aspect of CEO 
successions. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that relational ownership and 
capital intensity increase the likelihood of CEO continuity and reduce the likelihood of interim 
CEO successions. Furthermore, relational ownership and capital intensity interact in their effect 
on CEO continuity (but not on interim successions). The discussion outlines links with related 
strands of literature within and beyond property rights theory. 
This study has several limitations that lead to fruitful opportunities for future research. 
First, some European countries (such as Germany) have co-determination laws, mandating firms 
to offer employees seats on the board (Hertig, 2006). This direct representation of employees is 
likely to influence CEO continuity. The present study cannot capture this effect because 
Switzerland has no co-determination laws. Second, there can be political pressures on firms that 
are not reflected in their shareholder structures. In Switzerland, such outside influence is limited 
due to the tradition of limiting government’s interference in firms (sometimes described as 
laissez-faire capitalism). Future research could extend the analysis of CEO continuity to countries 
where the government’s interference is stronger. Third, in many other countries, there is a 
predominance of relational or transactional ownership, respectively (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Switzerland is akin to a microcosm that reflects these varying shareholder structures. Future 
cross-country research would be useful to validate and extend the empirical findings. 
The consideration of continuity in CEO successions is important for practitioners. Larcker 
and Miles’ (2010) survey of North American directors and CEOs illustrates the neglect of CEO 
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succession planning. Their survey shows that only 54 percent of firms are grooming an executive 
as successor to the current CEO. Furthermore, boards only spend an average of two hours a year 
to discuss and plan for CEO succession. In a majority of firms, boards do not know whether 
internal candidates would be willing to become CEO, if the job was offered to them. 
The theoretical and empirical analyses in this study suggest several recommendations for 
practitioners. First, it is important for boards to take into account the different shareholder 
structures and their implications for CEO continuity. Our findings show that firms with 
transactional ownership in a context of low capital intensity are particularly prone to CEO 
discontinuity. These disruptions present opportunities for firms to break with the past and change 
strategic directions. Simultaneously, however, boards need to mitigate the negative consequences 
of these disruptions by spending sufficient time on succession planning and managing the 
expectations of key stakeholders. Second, boards need to consider the requirements regarding the 
CEO’s firm-specific knowledge. When these requirements are high, such as in a capital-intensive 
context, an emphasis on continuity can induce CEOs to acquire firm-specific knowledge. This is 
particularly important when CEOs have discretion to influence accounting methods. Third, at the 
policy level, we suggest that there is not one best model of CEO succession. Many newspaper 
reports criticize the drop in average CEO tenures since the 1990s. This study shows, however, 
that CEO continuity is not uniformly low and that there are valid reasons for the observed 
variation in continuity. Thus, it is advisable that any regulatory response avoids a one-size-fits-all 
approach and takes into account the different needs of different types of firms. 
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Table 1 Theoretical perspectives on CEO succession 
 
 Agency Theory Property Rights Theory 
Variant in the 
literature 
We consider the classical variant that 
underpins most studies on CEO succession 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
We consider the pluralistic variant, suggesting 
that various stakeholders make investments 
that require protection (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). 
 
Key idea Shareholders delegate decision-making 
authority to the board and CEO. Incentive and 
control mechanisms help ensure that these 
agents act in shareholders’ interests. 
 
Reason: Contracts between shareholders and 
the board/CEO are incomplete. 
 
Stakeholders rely on the board and CEO to 
protect their investments in the firm. Effective 
protection helps ensure that stakeholders keep 
making value-creating investments. 
 
Reason: Contracts between stakeholders and 
the board/CEO are incomplete. 
 
CEO’s latitude 
of objectives 
Low. 
Shareholders can hold CEOs to account using 
measures of financial performance. 
 
High. 
There is no single objective criterion to hold 
CEOs to account (see, e.g., Jensen, 2010). 
 
CEO’s role CEOs are directly responsible for enhancing 
firm performance. 
 
CEOs are responsible for protecting implicit 
contracts with stakeholders. This protection, 
in turn, can enhance firm performance. 
 
CEO 
succession 
Boards should replace CEOs in the event of 
poor firm performance. 
 
A high sensitivity of CEO turnovers to firm 
performance is a sign of good corporate 
governance. 
 
Boards should support CEOs in protecting 
implicit contracts. 
 
CEO turnovers create disruption and 
uncertainty about the future protection of 
implicit contracts. 
 
Illustrative 
references 
General theory 
 Berle and Means (1932); Eisenhardt 
(1989); Fama and Jensen (1983); Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) 
 
CEO succession 
 Brickley (2003); Engel, Hayes and Wang 
(2003); Volpin (2002) 
General theory 
 Antras (2014); Grossman and Hart 
(1986); Klein, Mahoney, McGahan and 
Pitelis (2012); Zingales (2000) 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CEO continuity 0.91 0.29          
2. Relational ownership 0.46 0.29 0.02         
3. Capital intensity 4.73 1.43 0.02 0.14        
4. Stock return 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.04 0.03       
5. Adjusted ROA -0.01 0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.18      
6. CEO duality 0.15 0.36 0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02     
7. CEO founder 0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.16    
8. Predecessor founder 0.04 0.20 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03   
9. Firm size 7.53 1.82 -0.03 -0.27 -0.38 -0.02 0.19 0.03 -0.07 -0.05  
10. Firm growth 0.05 0.13 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.11 
N = 1,406. This table shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables. Correlations with an absolute value greater 
than 0.07 are significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 3 Discrete-time analysis predicting CEO continuity: Direct effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Relational ownership  
 
 
 
0.390** 
(0.172) 
Capital intensity  
 
 
 
0.171*** 
(0.0303) 
Stock return 0.294*** 
(0.113) 
 
 
0.294*** 
(0.112) 
Adjusted ROA  
 
-0.319 
(0.205) 
 
 
CEO duality 0.429** 
(0.195) 
0.388** 
(0.196) 
0.550*** 
(0.197) 
CEO founder 0.459 
(0.486) 
0.517 
(0.500) 
0.708 
(0.450) 
Predecessor founder 0.743** 
(0.354) 
0.682** 
(0.340) 
0.781** 
(0.370) 
Firm size 0.163*** 
(0.0117) 
0.163*** 
(0.0117) 
0.112*** 
(0.0173) 
Firm growth 0.303 
(0.353) 
0.308 
(0.352) 
0.224 
(0.363) 
    
Tenure year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,372 1,372 1,323 
Number of CEOs 337 339 334 
Wald chi2 681.1*** 657.7*** 796.6*** 
Log likelihood -441.5 -447.8 -399.8 
Standard errors in parentheses. Tests are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered by CEOs. 
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Table 4 Discrete-time analysis predicting CEO continuity: Interaction effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Relational ownership 0.395** 
(0.174) 
0.392** 
(0.173) 
1.977*** 
(0.496) 
Capital intensity 0.171*** 
(0.0303) 
0.166*** 
(0.0302) 
0.310*** 
(0.0626) 
Relational ownership * stock return -0.192 
(0.426) 
 
 
 
 
Capital intensity * stock return  
 
0.121 
(0.101) 
 
 
Relational ownership * capital intensity  
 
 
 
-0.373*** 
(0.113) 
Stock return 0.377* 
(0.199) 
-0.221 
(0.440) 
0.309*** 
(0.116) 
CEO duality 0.551*** 
(0.197) 
0.556*** 
(0.197) 
0.492** 
(0.193) 
CEO founder 0.700 
(0.452) 
0.707 
(0.446) 
0.594 
(0.430) 
Predecessor founder 0.781** 
(0.371) 
0.807** 
(0.374) 
0.770** 
(0.369) 
Firm size 0.112*** 
(0.0173) 
0.114*** 
(0.0174) 
0.0645** 
(0.0279) 
Firm growth 0.233 
(0.362) 
0.201 
(0.364) 
0.338 
(0.374) 
    
Tenure year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,323 1,323 1,323 
Number of CEOs 334 334 334 
Wald chi2 800.4*** 794.4*** 772.9*** 
Log likelihood -399.7 -399.2 -394.1 
Standard errors in parentheses. Tests are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered by CEOs. 
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Table 5 Probit regression predicting interim CEO succession provided that a CEO 
turnover occurs 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Main model Interim CEO succession 
Relational ownership -0.909** 
(0.386) 
-1.184 
(1.117) 
Capital intensity -0.212*** 
(0.0582) 
-0.241** 
(0.109) 
Relational ownership * 
capital intensity 
 
 
0.0585 
(0.264) 
Stock return -0.627** 
(0.256) 
-0.662** 
(0.269) 
CEO duality -4.863 
(4.868) 
-5.983*** 
(1.241) 
CEO founder -4.888*** 
(0.229) 
-6.544* 
(3.600) 
Predecessor founder 0.178 
(0.780) 
0.362 
(0.863) 
Firm size -0.0866** 
(0.0403) 
-0.0645 
(0.0589) 
Firm growth -0.622 
(0.705) 
-0.723 
(0.717) 
Selection model CEO turnover 
Relational ownership -0.388** 
(0.171) 
-1.946*** 
(0.496) 
Capital intensity -0.168*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.304*** 
(0.0629) 
Relational ownership * 
capital intensity 
 
 
0.367*** 
(0.113) 
Stock return -0.297*** 
(0.113) 
-0.312*** 
(0.117) 
CEO duality -0.551*** 
(0.197) 
-0.496** 
(0.193) 
CEO founder -0.726 
(0.447) 
-0.615 
(0.428) 
Predecessor founder -0.775** 
(0.368) 
-0.766** 
(0.368) 
Firm size -0.108*** 
(0.0178) 
-0.0611** 
(0.0281) 
Firm growth -0.233 
(0.358) 
-0.346 
(0.371) 
   
Tenure year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,323 1,323 
  37 
Censored observations 1,196 1,196 
Number of CEOs 334 334 
Log likelihood -447.6 -442.0 
Wald chi2 of independent 
equations (rho = 0) 
0.962 0.796 
Prob > chi2 of independent 
equations 
0.327 0.372 
Standard errors in parentheses. Tests are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered by CEOs. 
 
When applying a simple probit regression, we obtain results similar to the upper part of this table. 
However, such a model would be imprecise because an interim CEO succession can occur only if 
a CEO turnover takes place. Therefore, this table presents a selection estimation of a CEO 
turnover occurring (lower part of the table) and an estimation of the probability of interim CEO 
succession provided that a CEO turnover has occurred (upper part). To this end, we apply a 
variant of Heckman’s (1979) sample selection model that has been adapted to probit regressions 
(i.e., Heckman probit estimation) (see Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981). 
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Figure 1 Predicted probability of CEO continuity: Simulation of interaction effect 
 
 
This figure shows a statistical simulation of the interaction between relational ownership and 
capital intensity on CEO continuity. The two lines illustrate different levels of relational 
ownership: 20 percent (i.e., the first quartile) and at 68 percent (i.e., the third quartile). The bands 
around the lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. When relational ownership is low, 
CEO continuity is highly sensitive to the degree of capital intensity (i.e., the line has a 
considerable upward slope). 
